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9 TRIBAIR, INC. and ERIC REIHER

10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
11 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
12

13 ICALL, INC.,

14 Plaintiff,

15 v.

16 TRIBAIR, INC., ERIC REIHER and
17 DOES 1-5,

18 Defendants.

19 AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM.
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Case No. CV 12 2406

**OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE
SUBMITTED WITH REPLY BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

Date: November 15, 2012
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Ctmm: 5, 17th Floor
Judge: Hon. Edward M. Chen

Evidentiary Objections

Defendants Tribair, Inc. and Eric Reiher ("Defendants") hereby object to and move to strike the supplemental Declarations of Arlo C. Gilbert ("Gilbert") and Charles Carreon ("Carreon") submitted with the Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction ("Reply") of Plaintiff iCall, Inc. ("Plaintiff").

By submitting the declarations of Gilbert and Carreon with the Reply, Plaintiff has raised new evidence in its reply brief. Such a strategy is improper. Schwarzer et al., Fed. Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2012) ¶ 12:107 (citations omitted) ("It is improper for the moving party to 'shift gears' and introduce new facts or different legal arguments in the reply brief than presented in the moving papers.") Whether Plaintiff's new arguments or facts will be considered is at the discretion of the Court. *Zamani v. Carnes*, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (a "district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief"). Because Defendants are not entitled to a sur-reply brief, the court's consideration of the new evidence would deprive Defendants of the "adversarial exchange" intended by sequential briefing. Schwarzer et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial: Motion Practice (The Rutter Group 2012) ¶ 12:107.2. To prevent prejudice against Defendants, the court should strike the supplemental declarations of Gilbert and Carreon.

In addition, Defendants specifically object to the following statements made in the Gilbert and Carreon Declarations:

1. Gilbert ¶3. Gilbert offers a legal conclusion by calling Defendants' contention "spurious." As a lay witness, he is not qualified to offer opinions as to what constitutes a spurious legal argument. (Fed. R. Evid. 701).

2. Gilbert ¶3(c). Gilbert's comments about the definition of "the Internet" offer an expert opinion because the comments imply a specialized knowledge of "the Internet," but Gilbert has not been qualified as an expert. (Fed. R. Evid. 701, 702).

3. Gilbert ¶3(c)-(f). Gilbert's comments about the App Store and Google Play being available on the World Wide Web or Internet are irrelevant to Plaintiff's argument that WiCall is on the Internet. Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

1 4. Gilbert ¶5. Gilbert's comments that Tribair does not advertise its lack of text
2 messaging and videocalling were made without personal knowledge. (Fed. R. Evid. 602).

3 5. Gilbert ¶5. Gilbert's belief about what a user is "likely" to do is speculative and
4 lacks personal knowledge. (Fed. R. Evid. 602).

5 6. Gilbert ¶6(a). Gilbert's comment that iCall Enterprise is a paid VoIP service is
6 irrelevant. Plaintiff has never argued that the iCall Enterprise mark was infringed by Defendants.
7 (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

8 7. Gilbert ¶7(b). Gilbert comments that it is necessary to utilize techniques discussed
9 on a blog post. Gilbert lacks personal knowledge of Tribair's marketing practices. (Fed. R. Evid.
10 602).

11 8. Gilbert ¶7(b). Gilbert has not been qualified as an expert, to opine whether certain
12 techniques are "necessary" in order to have a successful marketing campaign. (Fed. R. Evid.
13 802).

14 9. Gilbert ¶7(c). Gilbert's comment that the Tribair VoIP Application ("Tribair
15 VoIP") appears in a search for iCall is irrelevant because Plaintiff's claims do not allege that
16 Tribair VoIP infringes on Plaintiff's mark. Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. (Fed. R. Evid.
17 402).

18 10. Gilbert ¶8(a). Gilbert lacks personal knowledge of Tribair, Inc.'s business
19 practices regarding the use of the Tribair VoIP. (Fed. R. Evid. 602).

20 11. Gilbert ¶8(b). Gilbert lacks personal knowledge of Tribair, Inc.'s ability to
21 communicate with its WiCall customers. (Fed. R. Evid. 602).

22 12. Gilbert ¶10. Gilbert's comments regarding the Wi-Fi Alliance are irrelevant
23 because they concern a mark not owned by Plaintiff. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

24 13. Gilbert ¶10(a)-(d). Gilbert lacks personal knowledge of the factual statements
25 about the Wi-Fi Alliance. (Fed. R. Evid. 602). The factual statements are argumentative and
26 irrelevant to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants. Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. (Fed. R.
27 Evid. 402).

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1 14. Gilbert ¶10(a)-(d). To the extent that Gilbert cites to the declaration of iCall's
2 counsel, Gilbert's comments constitute hearsay which does not fall into an exception to the rule
3 against hearsay. (Fed. R. Evid. 802).

4 15. Gilbert ¶10. Gilbert's comments regarding the Wi-Fi Alliance are irrelevant to
5 Plaintiff's claims. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

6 16. Gilbert ¶10(a)-(d). Gilbert lacks personal knowledge of the factual statements
7 listed. (Fed. R. Evid. 602). The factual statements are argumentative and irrelevant to Plaintiff's
8 claims against Defendants. Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

9 17. Gilbert ¶10(a)-(d). To the extent that Gilbert cites to the declaration of iCall's
10 counsel, Gilbert's comments constitute hearsay not within an exception to the rule against
11 hearsay. (Fed. R. Evid. 802).

12 18. Carreon ¶4. Carreon's summaries of Keating's statements are hearsay not within
13 an exception to the rule against hearsay. (Fed. R. Evid. 802).

14 19. Carreon ¶4. Carreon's summaries of Keating's statements regarding the Wi-Fi
15 Alliance are irrelevant to the issues of this case. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

16 20. Carreon ¶4 Exhibit 25. Exhibit 25 contains Keating's statements which are
17 inadmissible because Keating lacks personal knowledge of the facts recited in Carreon's email to
18 her. (Fed. R. Evid. 602). All of Keating's statements, reproduced in Exhibit 25, are hearsay not
19 within an exception to the rule against hearsay. (Fed. R. Evid. 802).

20 21. Carreon ¶4 and Exhibit 25. Carreon's comments and Keating's comments in
21 Exhibit 25 are inadmissible because they reach legal conclusions that Tribair has used the Wi-Fi
22 Alliance mark without authorization. Such a conclusion requires special knowledge outside the
23 normal knowledge of a lay witness. (Fed. R. Evid. 701, 702). Neither Carreon nor Keating has
24 been qualified as an expert on this subject.

25 22. Carreon ¶5. Carreon's promise to send a cease and desist letter to another infringer
26 is irrelevant and speculative. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

27 23. Carreon ¶5. Carreon's comment that only one infringer of the iCall mark is a VoIP
28 service is irrelevant to the issues of the preliminary injunction. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

1 24. Carreon ¶5. Carreon's comment that only one infringer of the iCall mark is
2 inadmissible because Carreon lacks personal knowledge of such information. (Fed. R. Evid.
3 602).

4 25. Carreon ¶6. Carreon's timeline of Defendant Tribair's marketing and brands is
5 inadmissible because Carreon lacks personal knowledge of such events. (Fed. R. Evid. 602).

6 26. Carreon ¶6(b). Carreon's belief that Tribair was jealous of iCall's popularity is
7 inadmissible because Carreon lacks personal knowledge of Tribair's state of mind. (Fed. R. Evid.
8 602).

9 27. Carreon ¶6(b). Carreon's statement about Tribair's lack of certification by a third
10 party is irrelevant to this case. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

11 28. Carreon ¶6(c). Carreon lacks personal knowledge of the alleged notification by
12 the Wi-Fi Alliance to Tribair. (Fed. R. Evid. 602). His purported knowledge is based upon
13 hearsay to which no exception to the hearsay rule applies. (Fed. R. Evid. 802).

14 29. Carreon ¶6(c). Carreon's comment that Tribair integrated "iCall" as a search term
15 of Tribair VoIP App is inadmissible because Carreon lacks personal knowledge of the
16 information he claims. (Fed. R. Evid. 602).

17 30. Carreon ¶6(c). Carreon's comment that the Tribair VoIP Application appears on
18 search results is inadmissible because it is irrelevant to the claimed infringement of WiCall upon
19 the iCall mark. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

20 31. Carreon ¶6(e). Carreon's comment that WiCall's logo is in defiance of a mark not
21 owned by Plaintiff is irrelevant to Plaintiff's claims. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

22 32. Carreon ¶6(e). Carreon's comment that WiCall's logo is in defiance of a mark not
23 owned by Plaintiff is inadmissible because Carreon lacks personal knowledge of the facts alleged.
24 (Fed. R. Evid. 602).

25 33. Carreon ¶6(e). Carreon's comment that WiCall's logo is in defiance of a mark not
26 owned by Plaintiff is inadmissible because it assumes a legal conclusion that has not been decided
27 by any court. In the absence of a court ruling of misappropriation, such an opinion requires
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1 special knowledge outside the normal knowledge of a lay witness. Neither Carreon nor Keating
2 has been qualified as an expert on this subject. (Fed. R. Evid. 701, 702).

3 34. Carreon ¶6(f). Carreon's comment that the Tribair VoIP app appears as a search
4 result is irrelevant because Plaintiff have never claimed that the Tribair VoIP app infringes
5 Plaintiff's mark. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

6 35. Carreon ¶7 Exhibit 28. The interview contained in Exhibit 28 is irrelevant because
7 the interview predates WiCall and does not discuss WiCall, the only subject which is the subject
8 of Plaintiff's claims. Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

9 36. Carreon ¶9 Exhibit 30. Exhibit 30 is irrelevant insofar as it offers opinions and
10 reviews by Exhibit 30's unnamed author. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

11 37. Carreon ¶9 Exhibit 30. Statements by the unnamed author of Exhibit 30 are
12 hearsay to which no exception to the rule against hearsay applies. (Fed. R. Evid. 802).

13 38. Carreon ¶9 Exhibit 30. The author of Exhibit 30 offers opinions about VoIP apps
14 outside the ordinary knowledge of a lay witness, but Plaintiff does not qualify the author as an
15 expert. (Fed. R. Evid. 701, 702).

16 39. Carreon ¶10 Exhibit 31. Exhibit 31 is irrelevant insofar as it is the result of a
17 lengthy and specific set of search terms without giving an explanation for why those specific
18 search terms are relevant to Plaintiff's claims. (Fed. R. Evid. 402).

19 Defendant will respectfully request the court at the hearing on the motion to strike the
20 supplemental declarations of Gilbert and Carreon as new evidence improperly introduced in the
21 Reply. In addition, Defendants will respectfully request the court to sustain the above specific
22 objections and to strike the evidence referred to above.

23 Dated: November 8, 2012

DONAHUE GALLAGHER WOODS LLP

24
25 By: 

John C. Kirke

Attorneys for Defendants

TRIBAIR, INC. and ERIC REIHER